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Abstract
How has the youth climate movement in the US grown since the Climate Strikes began and in what ways did it change as
it grew? This article takes advantage of a unique dataset that includes surveys from activists who organized the nation-
ally coordinated climate strikes in the US that began with Fridays for Future in spring 2019. Building on the research on
alliance building and strategic coalitions, this article analyzes how the patterns of participation changed over the period
of the study. We employ social network analysis to map the affiliation networks among the organizers of these events to
assess the coalitions of groups involved and the shifting organizational landscape. Our analysis does not provide evidence
that groups spanned the boundaries across movements, nor does it show that identity played a role in coalition building in
this movement. Instead, by mapping out the coalition of organizations within this movement and how connections among
them change over time, we see clear evidence that this youth-led movement was reoriented by adult-led organizations.
Our article concludes by considering how these findings suggest the future trajectory of the youth climate movement and
its role in a ‘new climate politics’ in America.
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1. Introduction
On 20 August 2018, Greta Thunberg participated in the
first climate strike ever. Inspired by the national school
walkout against gun violence in the US that was orga-
nized after the Parkland School Shooting in Florida, the
15 year-old decided to spend her Fridays sitting with a
hand written sign in front of the Swedish parliament.
Since that Friday in August, Fridays for Future—the name
of the group coordinating this tactic of skipping school
on Fridays to protest inaction on climate change—has
spread across the seas and around the world. In March
2019, the first ‘global’ climate strike took place, turn-
ing out more than one million people around the world
(Carrington, 2019). Six months later in September 2019,
young people and adults responded to a call by Thunberg
and other young activists to participate in climate strikes
as part of the Global Week for Future surrounding the
UN Climate Action Summit (Thunberg, 2019), and the
number of participants globally jumped to an estimated
7,6 million people (350.org Team, 2019).
In the US, the youth climate movement has also
grown. As school strikes have become more common,
the initial vanguard of young Americans who were
inspired by Thunberg along with their personal experi-
ences with climate change were joined by activists who
originally cut their teeth in the anti-Trump Resistance
(Fisher, 2019c; for a broader discussion of the Resistance,
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see Fisher, 2019a). At the same time, groups that were
founded specifically to organize young people around
the issue of climate change joined in coalition with
more established climate groups, as well as less climate-
focused organizations to mobilize participants to join
the growing movement. Although participation in these
climate strikes and the broader youth climate move-
ment expanded over the past two years, there is limited
research on the movement to date (cf. de Moor, De Vydt,
Uba, & Wahlström, 2020; Evensen, 2019; Fisher, 2019b;
Fisher & Nasrin, 2020; Martiskainen et al., 2020).
This article provides empirical evidence regarding
how the youth climate movement has grown in the US
since the globally coordinated Climate Strikes began in
spring 2019. We analyze a unique dataset that includes
surveys from 522 activists who helped to organize the
nationally coordinated climate strikes in the US that
beganwith Fridays for Future in 2019. Specifically, this arti-
cle builds on the research on coalition building in social
movements to analyze how the patterns of collaboration
changed over the period of the study, in terms of the orga-
nizational networks of the coordinators of these climate
strikes.We employ social network analysis tomap out the
affiliation networks among the individuals involved as a
means of assessing the shifting organizational landscape.
By analyzing what are the dominant organizational nodes
in the movement and how they are connected, our find-
ings show how the coalition changed over time.
This article is separated into three sections. First,
we present a brief review of the literature, paying par-
ticular attention to the ways that the extant research
has understood the role of organizational coalitions in
socialmovements. Second,weprovide details of the data
we collected and the methods used to analyze organi-
zational coalitions within the youth climate movement.
Third, we present the results of our analysis and discuss
the implications of our findings on a growing movement
that has been forced to change due to a global pandemic.
2. Alliance Building and Strategic Coalitions
In recent years, scholars of social movements have paid
substantial attention to the role that alliance build-
ing and strategic coalitions play in growing and main-
taining movements of all sorts (Barkan, 1979; Fantasia
& Stepan-Norris, 2007; Fantasia & Voss, 2004; Ferree
& Hess, 2016; Grimm, 2019; Levi & Murphy, 2006;
McAdam, 1982, 1983, 1983; Meyer & Corrigall-Brown,
2005; Polletta, 2002; Shaffer, 2000; Staggenborg, 1991;
Thomas & Trevino, 1993; Van Dyke &McCammon, 2010;
Wang, Piazza, & Soule, 2018). Research has looked at
coalitions of organizations that work within a single
socialmovement (see e.g., Heaney&Rojas, 2008;Morris,
1993), as well as coalitions across movements that span
boundaries (Wang et al., 2018; see also Beamish &
Luebbers, 2009; Meyer & Whittier, 1994; Van Dyke,
2003). In her study of movement activity among col-
lege students, VanDyke compares coalitions, finding that
“local threats inspire within-movement coalition events,
while larger threats that affect multiple constituencies or
broadly defined identities inspire cross-movement coali-
tion formation” (Van Dyke, 2003, p. 226).
Some of this research specifically looks at how coali-
tions and strategic alliances are associated with suc-
cessful movement outcomes (Gamson, 1990; Grimm,
2019; Levi & Murphy, 2006; Morris, 1993; Steedly &
Foley, 1979; Van Dyke, 2003). In her well-known study of
the pro-choicemovement, Staggenborg (1991) discusses
how organizational coalitions help groups compensate
for their lack of resources and organizational insufficien-
cies to generate grassroots supports (see also Borland,
2008; Wang et al., 2018). Similarly, when Beamish and
Luebbers (2009) look at the coalition among environmen-
tal justice, peace, and anti-weapons proliferation groups,
they find that successful coalitions involve ongoing social
interactions that help to reduce the potential for inter-
group conflicts. When conflicts and differences in per-
spective are not addressed, they can “erode member-
ship, break down collective incentives and commitments,
and thus undermine socialmovement efficacy” (Beamish
& Luebbers, 2009, p. 647; see also Barkan, 1979; Bliuc,
Betts, Vergani, Iqbal, & Dunn, 2019; Cárdenas & de
la Sablonnière, 2020; Freeman, 1972; Gamson, 1990;
Lichterman, 1996; Staggenborg, 1991).
To date, there have been a handful of studies
that examine how intersectionality contributes to social
movements (Heaney & Rojas, 2015; see also Milkman,
2017; Swank & Fahs, 2013; Terriquez, 2015). Scholars
have used intersectionality as a theory, an analytical
framework (Cho, Crenshaw, & McCall, 2013; Choo &
Ferree, 2010; Crenshaw, 1991), as well as a method
(Hancock, 2007) to examine how intersections of race,
class, gender, sexual orientation, legal status, and other
categories of identity are linked to structures of inequal-
ity and produce different life experiences and forms
of oppression or privilege (for a general discussion of
intersectionality, see Cho et al., 2013; Choo & Ferree,
2010; Collins, 2002; Crenshaw, 1991; Valentine, 2007).
The definition of intersectionality and its applications
have evolved over time. Intersectionality was originally
developed by legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw (1991)
to explain how African American women faced chal-
lenges when pursuing claims of employment discrimina-
tion. Although it originated in discussions of women of
color, contemporary research on intersectionality aims
to explain the experiences and complexities of both
marginalized and privileged groups in society (Carbado,
2013; Cho et al., 2013; Shows & Gerstel, 2009; Wingfield,
2009). Some scholars have suggested that these intersec-
tions divide people into silos characterized by distinct
and competing interests that prevent the kind of coali-
tion building that is necessary for strong social move-
ment organizing. For example, intersectionality has been
criticized as producing ‘identity politics’ that focuses on
narrow group interests at the expense of broader politi-
cal claims (Brown, 1995; Ehrenreich, 2002).
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At the same time, a limited number of studies of
collective action have specifically explored how intersec-
tional interests can be used to build coalitions within and
across socialmovements, thereby increasing the number
and diversity of activists (Adam, 2017; Carastathis, 2013;
Fisher, Dow,&Ray, 2017; Fisher, Jasny, &Dow, 2018; Goss
&Heaney, 2010; Roberts& Jesudason, 2013;Wadsworth,
2011). In her influential work, Kimberlé Crenshaw (1991)
suggests that intersectionality—which highlights the
intersections of race, gender, social class, and other
social qualities—can promote coalitions instead of divi-
sions (see also Hancock, 2007). Identity-based groups
are recognized as spaces of similarity, seclusion, and
safety (Reagon, 1983). Building directly off of the work
of Crenshaw (1991), Carastathis (2013, p. 941) makes a
case for thinking about identity groups as coalitions that
facilitates “effective political coalitions that cross exist-
ing identity categories.” In other words, not only can
coalitions be formed by spanning movement boundaries
(see especially Wang et al., 2018), but they can combine
efforts of people with different identities in a common
struggle. Within this research, some studies have specifi-
cally explored intersectional mobilization processes and
how shared grievances play a role (see Terriquez, 2015).
In their study of the overlapping motivations of
protest participants, Fisher et al. (2017) provide evidence
for these claims by looking at how intersectionality mobi-
lized activists to join the first Women’s March in 2017.
The authors conclude that:
Individuals were more likely to be motivated by
issues connected to the social identities that were
most salient for them: Black participants mobilized
for Racial Justice, Hispanic participants mobilized for
Immigration, and women mobilized for Reproductive
Rights. Our analysis supports previous studies that
find that individuals concerned with a range of social
issues can establish and build coalitions informed by
intersectional motivations. (Fisher et al., 2017, p. 5;
see also Fisher et al., 2018)
2.1. Using Network Analysis to Study Coalitions
Much of the research studying coalitions within social
movements focuses specifically on the role of social
ties and social networks to facilitate connections among
individuals and organizations (Gould, 1991; Heaney &
Rojas, 2008; Kim & Bearman, 1997; Klandermans &
Oegema, 1987; Marwell, Oliver, & Prahl, 1988; Mische
& Pattison, 2000; Park, 2008; Rosenthal, Fingrutd, Ethier,
Karant, & McDonald, 1985). Numerous studies have
concluded that individuals’ ties to organizations play
an important role in mobilizing activists (Passy, 2003;
Saunders, Grasso, Olcese, Rainsford, & Rootes, 2012; for
an overview, see Diani & McAdam, 2003). Moreover,
social networks analysis has been employed to study
how movements are expanded and connected to other
groups. Studying the Italian environmental movement,
for example, Diani shows how networks in social move-
ments are largely formed based on members’ social-
ization experience, issues priorities, and organizational
differences (Diani, 1995). In their edited volume, Diani
and McAdam (2003) discuss how networks facilitate
inter-organizational alliances that can strengthen social
movements. In other cases, research has employed
social network analysis to analyze when coalitions fall
apart (see particularly Heaney & Rojas, 2008).
In his piece in The Blackwell Companion to Social
Movements, Diani outlines the ways that analysis of indi-
vidual activists and their organizational affiliations can
explore “how activists connect groups” to understand
“the web of multiple ties that ultimately make up a social
movement” (Diani, 2007, pp. 348, 339; see also Diani,
2010; Diani, Lindsay, & Purdue, 2010; Heaney & Rojas,
2008; Rosenthal et al., 1985). Consistent with this work
that employs social network analysis, our article builds
on the research on coalitions among social movement
organizations to assess how the affiliation networks of
the organizers in the Youth Climate Movement in the
US changed during the period of our study. Though our
analysis, we are able to assess the degree to which orga-
nizational coalitions in this movement cross movements,
issues, and identities over time.
3. Data and Methods
This article integrates data collected through threewaves
of online surveys of the hosts of the events coordinated
by the youth climatemovement from 2019–2020. ‘Hosts’
are the termused by themovement to describe the local-
level of organizers for climate strikes; theywere responsi-
ble for coordinating local mobilization and logistics. Data
were collected from these hostswhoworked on the inter-
nationally coordinated climate strikes in the US in spring
2019, the Global Climate Strike in September 2019, and
for Earth Day Live in April 2020. In total, the dataset
includes surveys from 522 activists who helped to orga-
nize the nationally coordinated climate strikes in the US
that began with Fridays for Future. In the sections that
follow, we describe each wave of data collection.
3.1. Data Collection from the US Hosts of Fridays for
Future in Spring 2019
To begin this project, data were collected from the
US-based hosts who coordinated the 2019 spring cli-
mate strikes in March and May. Contact information for
organizers of the strikes was collected from the group
that coordinated the events: Fridays for Future. The offi-
cial website of Fridays for Future includes information
for any organizer who is willing to share their informa-
tion by date and location of event. An individual link
to an internet-based survey was shared with everyone
who signed up with Fridays for Future to organize a
US-based strike. The survey yielded a 21% response rate.
To make sure that all youth climate activists who had
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been involved in organizing climate strikes in the US
were included in the sample, an anonymous link was also
shared via groups working specifically to engage young
people in the US around the issue of climate change.
In total, 220 people completed the survey.
3.2. Data Collection from the US Hosts from the Global
Climate Strike
Following the success of the spring 2019 climate strikes,
Greta Thunberg and other young activists called for
adults to join young people in the streets for climate
strikes that were coordinated as part of the ‘Global
Week for Future’ surrounding the UN Climate Action
Summit in September 2019 (Thunberg, 2019). The strikes
turned out estimated 7,6 million people globally and
over 500,000 people in the US (350.org Team, 2019).
Working with one of the coordinating organizations for
the September strikes in the US—Future Coalition, which
coordinated the StrikeWithUs website—we conducted
an online survey of all of the hosts of the 633 events
being coordinated around the US as part of the Global
Climate Strike on 20 September 2019. An initial email and
two reminders that included an anonymous link to our
surveywere sent out by the organization to their list of cli-
mate strike hosts before the event. The email requested
that they participate in our study. In total, 131 hosts com-
pleted the survey, representing a 21% response rate.
3.3. Data Collection from the US Hosts of Earth Day Live
In early 2020, organizers were planning for even larger
strikes and demonstrations and were working to coor-
dinate a huge event to coincide with the 50th anniver-
sary of Earth Day in April. However, with the global
spread of Covid-19 and the enforcement of social distanc-
ing, climate activists called off their in-person protests
and worked to move their activism online (Thunberg,
2020). In the US, the organizational coalition that was
working to plan a three-day climate strike in April tran-
sitioned their efforts to coordinate a three-day digital
event called ‘EarthDay Live,’whichwas scheduled to take
place from 22–24 April 2020 by the US Climate Strike
Coalition of youth-led organizations. As part of the event,
organizers encouraged activists to participate in numer-
ous activities including virtual protests, tweet storms,
hashtag activism that targeted specific corporations, and
posting selfies with signs. It is worth noting that this
event was independent of the commemoration of the
anniversary of EarthDay,whichwas also called ‘EarthDay
Live’ and was coordinated by the adult-led group: Earth
Day Network.
Like data collection for the Global Climate Strike in
September 2019, data for this wave of the study were
collected through one of the leaders of the organiza-
tional coalition for the event: Future Coalition. The orga-
nization shared an anonymous link to the survey via an
email and two follow-up reminders with their list of all of
the local hosts of the Earth Day Live mobilization in the
US. The link was shared with the 1,269 people who had
signed up to host any of the events that they had coor-
dinated over the year. This list included 442 individuals
who signed up specifically to serve as a host for the Earth
Day Live event. In total, 171 hosts completed the survey
(representing a response rate of 14% of the total list of
organizers and 39% of the people specifically signed up
for this event in April 2020). Table 1 presents an overview
of the data included in this article.
4. Findings
We begin by presenting an overview of the data col-
lected from these three waves of youth climate activism
in theUS. Next, we discuss our analytic technique for ana-
lyzing the affiliation networks of the organizers of this
movement. Finally, we present the results of our net-
work analysis that shows how the organizational coali-
tions changed over the period of our study.
4.1. Overview of the Dataset
Consistent with other studies of activism during this
period of heightened contention in the US (see e.g.,
Fisher, 2019a; Fisher et al., 2019), organizers during
all three waves of the movement—in spring 2019, fall
2019, and spring 2020—were predominantly female
(66%, 68%, and 65% respectively), majority White (67%,
77%, and 72% respectively), and came from highly edu-
cated families. During all three waves, the majority of
participants reported coming from households with par-
ents/guardians who had completed an undergraduate
degree or higher. In other words, there is consistency in
Table 1. Overview of data collected.
Spring Climate Strike Global Climate Strike Earth Day Live
Organizers Organizers Organizers
Date of event(s) 15 March and 24 May 2019 20 September 2019 22–24 April 2020
Number of Events 163 633 442
Number of Respondents 220 (35 from Fridays for Future) 131 171
Response Rate 21%* 21% 39%
Note = * Percentage based on the number of respondents who had organized with Fridays for Future.
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 112–123 115
the identities of the participants at each strike. Although
it is possible that these findings are due, in part, to
response biases in the methodology, these patterns
regarding the gender, race, and educational attainment
of our dataset are consistent with previous research
on the demographics of the environmental and climate
movements in the US (Giugni & Grasso, 2015; see also
Fisher et al., 2019).
As expected, organizers in this movement were
young. However, the median age of the hosts went
up substantially over the period of our study: Hosts of
the spring 2019 strikes reported a median age of only
18 years-old, those organizing in fall 2019 reported a
median age of 25, and the organizers for Earth Day Live
in April 2020 had a median age of 32.
4.2. Organizational Affiliations of Hosts
As previously noted, our analysis focuses on the affilia-
tions of the hosts in this movement and employs social
network analysis to map out how the organizational
coalition changes over time (Diani, 2007; Heaney&Rojas,
2008; Rosenthal et al., 1985; see also Mische & Pattison,
2000). Data are based on respondents’ responses to the
question: “Are you a member of any organization or
group that is involved in the global climate strike or youth
climatemovement?” If respondents said yes to this ques-
tion, theywere asked towrite in the names of up to three
groups. The overall number of groups named by each
individual organizer goes down during this time period:
In summer 2019, respondents mentioned being affili-
ated with an average of 2.9 groups per respondent; in
fall 2019, respondents answered 1.8 groups per person;
and in spring 2020, respondents mentioned 1.7 groups
per respondent.
4.2.1. Most Common Organizations in Each Wave
Next, we look at what organizations werementioned the
most in each wave of data collection to understand the
overall organizational ecosystem of the youth climate
movement. Table 2 presents the counts of the top organi-
zations mentioned in each wave of data collection along
with the percentage each group received.We list all orga-
nizations that received five or more mentions during at
least one wave of the study.
Although Sunrise was consistently the most men-
tioned organization during each wave of the study, the
other most mentioned organizations changed over time.
During the first wave of the study in summer 2019, the
top three groups were Sunrise, US Youth Climate Strike,
and Fridays for Future—all of which are youth-led organi-
zations. In fall 2019, organizers named Sunrise, 350 and
US Youth Climate Strike as the most common groups.
It is worth noting that 350 is an environmental organi-
zation that was founded in 2008 by “a group of univer-
sity friends in the US alongwith author Bill McKibben…to
build a global climate movement” (350.org Team, 2021).
Even though it was founded by young people in 2008, it
has grown to be a professionalized environmental group
that is adult-led. In spring 2020, Sunrise continued to
be the most mentioned group with almost a quarter
of all respondents (23%) reporting being affiliated with
it. The other most mentioned organizations were both
adult-led environmental groups: 350 and the Sierra Club.
Even though more general organizations were in the net-
work, based on these findings, there is no evidence of
groups that span boundaries playing a substantial role
in this coalition (Wang et al., 2018; see also Beamish &
Luebbers, 2009).
4.3. Analyzing Organizational Affiliation Networks
Building directly off Diani’s work (2007), the next step
in our analysis is mapping out the affiliation networks
of the organizers of the climate strikes to understand
the co-occurrence of membership in groups. Comparing
these affiliation networks over time, we are able to
see more clearly how the coalition changed during the
period of study. Before presenting the affiliation net-
works of these climate activists over time, we discuss our
analytic technique.
Table 2. Counts of top organizations and frequency by sample (all groups with 5 or more mentions).
Spring Climate Strike Global Climate Strike Earth Day Live
Organizers Organizers Organizers
Organization (N = 220) (N = 131) (N = 171)
Sunrise 27 (12%) 23 (18%) 39 (23%)
US Youth Climate Strike 21 (10%) 12 (9%) 10 (6%)
Fridays For Future 19 (9%) 2 (2%) 3 (2%)
Extinction Rebellion 13 (6%) 4 (3%) 8 (5%)
Schools for Climate Action 9 (4%) 0 1 (1%)
This is Zero Hour 7 (3%) 1 (1%) 6 (4%)
350 5 (2%) 16 (12%) 32 (19%)
Sierra club 3 (1%) 5 (4%) 14 (8%)
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4.3.1. Network Analysis Technique
We visualized the organizational coalitions as an actor-
organization affiliation network by creating a bipartite
graph for each climate strike separately. In these net-
works, hosts (who are respondents in the survey) are
represented by grey diamonds and organizations with
which they are affiliated are represented by green cir-
cles. The groups that are youth-led are depicted as a
light green circles and those groups that are adult-led are
depicted as a dark green circles. The ties between a host
and an organization are represented as a line. Node size
of the organizations corresponds to the degree central-
ity of the group. By mapping out co-occurrence of orga-
nizational affiliation, these visualizations provide more
evidence about the coalition in terms of who is playing
a central role and how organizations are related to one
another in terms of sharing members, as well as how
they change over time.
Affiliation networks for each wave of the study are
presented in the next section. Consistent with Table 2,
only groups that were mentioned by at least five respon-
dents during at least onewave of the survey are included
in the analysis. Groups that received zero mentions dur-
ing a particular wave are absent from that specific net-
work diagram.
4.3.2. Spring 2019 Climate Strike Affiliation Network
The affiliation network of organizers from the spring
2019 climate strikes are presented in Figure 1. The dia-
gram shows clear evidence that the coalition is being
steered by youth-led groups: Not only are youth-led
groups the most popular individually, but the most cen-
tral nodes are Sunrise and US Youth Climate Strike, which
are youth-led groups based in the US, which are con-
nected through various activists to the internationally
focused youth-led group Fridays for Future. It is also
worth noting that Sunrise, which gained notoriety when
its members occupied Nancy Pelosi’s office in December
2018 calling for a GreenNewDeal (Sonmez, 2018), is con-
nected to every other group in the network through at
least one member. In this network, adult-led groups play
a relatively peripheral role; only Extinction Rebellion con-
nects to the most central youth-led organizations.
4.3.3. September 2019 Climate Strike Affiliation
Network
Whenwe look at the affiliation network of hosts from the
September 2019 climate strikes presented in Figure 2,we
see clear evidence of changes in the organizational coali-
tion. Although Sunrise continues to be the central node
in the network with connections to numerous other
youth-led groups, adult-led groups have started to play
a larger role in the coalition. It is worth noting that in
September 2019, Fridays for Future is no longer playing
a prominent role in the network. Moreover, this group
that was formed in response to the organizing efforts of
Greta Thunberg is the only youth-led group that is not
directly connected to themost prominent group: Sunrise.
Instead, the adult-led 350 plays a much bigger role dur-
ing this wave, even though it is only directly connected
to two groups: Sunrise and the adult-led Sierra Club.
4.3.4. Earth Day Live Affiliation Network
Sunrise continues to play a central role in the affiliation
network of organizers during the Earth Day Live event,
which is presented in Figure 3. In fact, during this wave,
Figure 1. Affiliation network for Spring 2019 strikes.
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Figure 2. Affiliation network of organizers for September 2019 strikes.
Sunrisemembers report being affiliatedwith every other
top organization in the network except for Schools for
Climate Action, which is not a central group in this net-
work. In contrast to the previous waves of the study, the
other two top groups in this network are adult-led 350
and Sierra Club. The April 2020 network is denser, with
the adult-led groups all being connected to one another
as well as to the numerous other youth-led groups.
Figure 3. Affiliation network for organizers of Earth Day Live, April 2020.
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5. Conclusions
By analyzing the affiliation networks of the local hosts
from three waves of climate activism in the US, we see
clear evidence about how the coalition of thismovement
has changed. Across all waves of activism, we do not
see evidence of groups that span movement boundaries
playing a large role in the coalition (Beamish & Luebbers,
2009; Wang et al., 2018; see also Goss & Heaney, 2010).
Rather, the coalition continues to be led by groups with a
mission to address the climate crisis. We also do not see
clear evidence of intersectionality in terms of the iden-
tities of the members of the groups in these coalitions
(Carastathis, 2013). To the degree that age canbe an iden-
tity, we do see evidence that the youth-led groups, which
tend to have less professionalized leadership and struc-
ture, were supplanted over time by adult-led organiza-
tions. In other words, although it began as a clear case
of youth-led activism, by spring 2020, the coalition was
being led by a combination of youth and adult-led groups.
Not only did the median age of the organizers go up sub-
stantially during the period of study, but the organiza-
tional coalition shifted to include a number of adult-led
groups that were playing a more central role.
This change is due, in part, to the duration of the
climate struggle. As research has documented, more
professionalized organizations—like 350 or Sierra Club—
play important roles in sustaining activism (Staggenborg,
1991). Well-established organizations that have consis-
tent funding streams and long-term members sustain
participation and activism during the slower and more
difficult periods. It is worth repeating that 350 was
started in 2008 by a group of young people working with
activist Bill McKibben to stop the climate crisis, but these
young people have grown up and the organization has
professionalized over the past 12 years.
At the same time, our findings also provide evidence
of the ways that external factors and political opportu-
nities affect coalitions (Meyer & Corrigall-Brown, 2005).
In this case, the Covid-19 pandemic and all the sub-
sequent Covid-19-related changes to opportunities for
activism during stay-at-home orders are likely to have
played a substantial role in the changes in the coalition
and the movement. In their recent assessment of this
cycle of climate activism internationally, de Moor et al.
(2020, p. 1) note that the pandemic “arguably marks the
end of the first chapter of the recent climate protest
cycle.” Although we believe that it is premature to deter-
mine if the cycle is completed, there is no question that
the pandemic and the changes in protesting behavior
due to it, had a direct effect on the trajectory of the
movement in terms of who was involved and what tac-
tics they employed.
As the pandemic wears on, school strikes continue to
be held mostly indoors and on social media, which has
reduced participation considerably. With professional
adult-led groups playing a more central role in the coali-
tion, one might expect the movement to focus on more
mainstream tactics (like demonstrating on a weekend
rather than during the school day when participants
must skip school) and to redirect its efforts beyond young
people. Instead of following this trajectory, much of the
work of the youth climate movement in the US since the
Earth Day Live event in April 2020 involved a redirection
of efforts away from the tactic of the climate strike.
In summer 2020, huge demonstrations took place
across the US in response to the police killing of unarmed
Black citizens including George Floyd and Breonna Taylor.
In response, a number of youth-led climate groups—
including the Strike With Us coalition of youth climate
groups, which includes Sunrise—called for their mem-
bers to mobilize in solidarity with the Black Lives Matter
movement (Strike With Us, 2020; Sunrise Team, 2020a).
In addition, these groups focused much of their efforts
during the second half of 2020 on mobilizing young peo-
ple to participate in the election. Sunrise, in particular,
received a lot of media attention for its work around
the election and in swing states (see e.g., Arrieta-Kenna,
2019) and the group announced a new program to sup-
port young people to run for political office in Fall 2020
(Sunrise Team, 2020b). Such efforts provide clear evi-
dence that, even though the tactic of the school strike
has become less common, the youth climate movement
in the US continues.
It is important to highlight here that comparisons
between the movement in the US and in other parts
of the world should be interpreted with caution. Not
only is the trajectory of the movement broader than
the time period of our study, but the US case is very
much a product of the political and organizational land-
scape of America. As has been noted elsewhere (Fisher,
2019c), climate strikes beganduring a timeof heightened
contention in the US, and many participants in these
strikes reported very high levels of engagement in other
protests as part of the anti-Trump Resistance prior to
participating in climate activism through school strikes.
Moreover, therewere already a number of organizations,
including Sunrise, working within the youth climate
space in the US before the first climate strikes began
in this country (Sonmez, 2018; see also Arrieta-Kenna,
2019). When the tactic of the school strike became pop-
ular, these more established organizations played an
important role in supporting the network of activists
participating in the movement. As has been previously
noted, such groups are always more capable of sustain-
ing and supporting activism over time and they are now
leading the movement to engage in other tactics.
The findings from this study of the youth climate
movement in the US point to some clear opportuni-
ties for future research. First and foremost, this study
provides a snapshot of a limited period of time in the
youth climatemovement in the US. Future researchmust
continue to study this movement, focusing on the indi-
viduals participating and the organizations involved to
understand the broader trajectory of the long-term cli-
mate struggle. It is unclear the degree to which our
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 112–123 119
findings in theUSwould be different if data collection had
begun earlier as groups were just beginning to organize
climate strikes or if a global pandemic had not occurred.
Moreover, as the tactics of the movement have
shifted, it is important to look at the ways the coali-
tion of organizations involved in the movement has also
changed. In particular, future research should explore
what role resources, organizational structures, political
opportunities, and tactics play in the trajectory of the
youth climatemovement. Although such research should
continue to collect extensive data through surveys, it
would benefit from integrating intensive open-ended
semi-structured interviews with individual activists and
organizational representatives. Future research is also
needed to explore in more detail the role that local hosts
are playingwithin themovement. Although there is scant
evidence that these individuals were central to decision-
making around the national climate strikes, future inves-
tigation can help us understand what roles they may be
playing in coordinating climate activism in their commu-
nities and sustaining activism at the local level. Finally,
following the recommendations from Fisher and Nasrin
(2020), research should aim to connect this climate
activism to its broader effects on the individuals and
organizations involved, the policies they are aiming to
influence, and the material outcomes of these efforts in
terms of actual environmental changes.
Acknowledgments
Research for this project was funded, in part, through
a grant from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.
The authorswould like to thank theAcademic Editors and
two anonymous reviewers for their comments on an ear-
lier draft of this article.
Conflict of Interests
The authors declare no conflict of interests.
References
350.org Team. (2019, September 28). 7.6 million people
demand action after week of climate strikes. 350.org
Team. Retrieved from https://350.org/7-million-
people-demand-action-after-week-of-climate-
strikes
350.org Team. (2021, March 24). About 350. 350.org
Team. Retrieved from https://350.org/about
Adam, E. M. (2017). Intersectional coalitions: The para-
doxes of rights-based movement building in LGBTQ
and immigrant communities. Law & Society Review,
51(1), 132–167.
Arrieta-Kenna, R. (2019, June 16). The Sunrisemovement
actually changed the democratic conversation: So
what do you do for a sequel? Politico. Retrieved from
https://politi.co/2WJnIa2
Barkan, S. E. (1979). Strategic, tactical and organizational
dilemmas of the protest movement against nuclear
power. Social Problems, 27(1), 19–37.
Beamish, T. D., & Luebbers, A. J. (2009). Alliance build-
ing across social movements: Bridging difference in
a peace and justice coalition. Social Problems, 56(4),
647–676.
Bliuc, A.-M., Betts, J., Vergani, M., Iqbal, M., & Dunn, K.
(2019). Collective identity changes in far-right online
communities: The role of offline intergroup conflict.
New Media & Society, 21(8), 1770–1786.
Borland, E. (2008). Social movement organizations and
coalitions: Comparisons from the women’s move-
ment in Buenos Aires, Argentina. In P. G. Coy (Ed.),
Research in social movements, conflicts and change
(pp. 83–112). Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing
Limited.
Carastathis, A. (2013). Identity categories as potential
coalitions. Signs, 38(4), 941–965.
Carbado, D. W. (2013). Colorblind Intersectionality.
Signs: Journal ofWomen in Culture and Society, 38(4),
811–845.
Cárdenas, D., & de la Sablonnière, R. (2020). Intergroup
conflict and the process of social change: Similar con-
flicts, different intragroup processes. Peace and Con-
flict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 26(3), 303–313.
Carrington, D. (2019, March 19). School climate
strikes: 1.4 million people took part, say campaign-




Cho, S., Crenshaw, K. W., & McCall, L. (2013). Toward
a field of intersectionality studies: Theory, applica-
tions, and praxis. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture
and Society, 38(4), 785–810.
Choo, H. Y., & Ferree, M. M. (2010). Practicing intersec-
tionality in sociological research: A critical analysis of
inclusions, interactions, and institutions in the study
of inequalities. Sociological Theory, 28(2), 129–149.
Collins, P. H. (2002). Black feminist thought: Knowledge,
consciousness, and the politics of empowerment. Lon-
don: Routledge.
Crenshaw, K. W. (1991). Mapping the margins: Inter-
sectionality, identity politics, and violence against
women of color. Stanford Law Review, 43(6),
1241–1299.
de Moor, J., De Vydt, M., Uba, K., & Wahlström, M.
(2020). New kids on the block: Taking stock of the
recent cycle of climate activism. Social Movement
Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2020.
1836617
Diani, M. (1995). Green networks: A structural analysis
of the Italian environmental movement. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press.
Diani, M. (2007). Networks and participation. In D. A.
Snow, S. A. Soule, & H. Kriesi (Eds.), The Blackwell
companion to social movements (pp. 339–359). New
York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 112–123 120
Diani, M. (2010). Promoting the protest: The organi-
zational embeddedness of the demonstrators. In S.
Walgrave & D. Rucht (Eds.), The world says no to
war: Demonstrations against the war on Iraq (pp.
194–214).Minneapolis,MN: University ofMinnesota
Press.
Diani, M., Lindsay, I., & Purdue, D. (2010). Sustained
interactions? Social movements and coalitions in
local settings. In N. Van Dyke & H. J. McCammon
(Eds.), Strategic alliances: Coalition building and
social movements (pp. 219–238). Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press.
Diani, M., & McAdam, D. (Eds.). (2003). Social move-
ments and networks: Relational approaches to collec-
tive action. Oxford and New York, NY: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Ehrenreich, N. (2002). Subordination and symbiosis:
Mechanisms of mutual support between subordinat-
ing systems. UMKC Law Review, 71(2), 251–324.
Evensen, D. (2019). The rhetorical limitations of the #Fri-
daysForFuture movement. Nature Climate Change,
9(6), 428–430.
Fantasia, R., & Stepan-Norris, J. (2007). The labor move-
ment in motion. In D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, & H. Kriesi
(Eds.), The Blackwell companion to social movements
(pp. 555–575). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Fantasia, R., & Voss, K. (2004). Hard work: Remaking the
American labor movement. Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press.
Ferree, M. M., & Hess, B. (2016). Controversy and
coalition: The new feminist movement across four
decades of change. London: Routledge.
Fisher, D. R. (2019a). American resistance: From the
women’s march to the blue wave. New York, NY:
Columbia University Press.
Fisher, D. R. (2019b). The broader importance of
#FridaysForFuture. Nature Climate Change, 9(6),
430–431.
Fisher, D. R. (2019c, July 12). The Youth Climate Summit
starts July 12. It’s full of young activists trained
in the anti-Trump movement. The Washington




Fisher, D. R., Andrews, K. T., Caren, N., Chenoweth, E.,
Heaney, M. T., Leung, T., . . . Pressman, J. (2019). The
science of contemporary street protest: New efforts
in theUnited States. ScienceAdvances, 5(10). https://
doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.aaw5461
Fisher, D. R., Dow, D. M., & Ray, R. (2017). Intersection-
ality takes it to the streets: Mobilizing across diverse
interests for the Women’s March. Science Advances,
3(9). https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.aao1390
Fisher, D. R., Jasny, L., & Dow, D. M. (2018). Why are we
here? Patterns of intersectional motivations across
the resistance. Mobilization: An International Quar-
terly, 23(4), 451–468.
Fisher, D. R., & Nasrin, S. (2020). Climate activism and
its effects. WIREs Climate Change. https://doi.org/
10.1002/wcc.683
Freeman, J. (1972). The tyranny of structurelessness.
Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 17, 151–164.
Gamson,W. A. (1990). The strategy of social protest (2nd
ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Pub.
Giugni, M., & Grasso, M. T. (2015). Environmental
movements in advanced industrial democracies: Het-
erogeneity, transformation, and institutionalization.
Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 40(1),
337–361.
Goss, K. A., & Heaney, M. T. (2010). Organizing women
as women: Hybridity and grassroots collective action
in the 21st century. Perspectives on Politics, 8(1),
27–52.
Gould, R. V. (1991). Multiple networks and mobilization
in the Paris Commune, 1871. American Sociological
Review, 56(6), 716–729.
Grimm, J. J. (2019). Egypt is not for sale! Harnessing
nationalism for alliance building in Egypt’s Tiran and
Sanafir island protests.Mediterranean Politics, 24(4),
443–466.
Hancock, A.-M. (2007). When multiplication doesn’t
equal quick addition: Examining intersectionality as
a research paradigm. Perspectives on Politics, 5(1),
63–79.
Heaney, M. T., & Rojas, F. (2008). Coalition dissolution,
mobilization, and network dynamics in the US anti-
war movement. In P.G. Coy (Ed.), Research in social
movements, conflicts and change (pp. 39–82). Bing-
ley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
Heaney, M. T., & Rojas, F. (2015). Party in the street: The
antiwar movement and the Democratic Party after
9/11. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kim, H., & Bearman, P. S. (1997). The structure and
dynamics of movement participation. American Soci-
ological Review, 62(1), 70–93.
Klandermans, B., & Oegema, D. (1987). Potentials, net-
works, motivations, and barriers: Steps towards par-
ticipation in social movements. American Sociologi-
cal Review, 52(4), 519–531.
Levi, M., & Murphy, G. H. (2006). Coalitions of con-
tention: The case of theWTOprotests in Seattle. Polit-
ical Studies, 54(4), 651–670.
Lichterman, P. (1996). The search for political community:
American activists reinventing commitment. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Martiskainen, M., Axon, S., Sovacool, B. K., Sareen, S.,
Furszyfer Del Rio, D., & Axon, K. (2020). Contextual-
izing climate justice activism: Knowledge, emotions,
motivations, and actions among climate strikers in
six cities. Global Environmental Change, 65. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2020.102180
Marwell, G., Oliver, P. E., & Prahl, R. (1988). Social net-
works and collective action: A theory of the criti-
cal mass, III. American Journal of Sociology, 94(3),
502–534.
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 112–123 121
McAdam, D. (1982). Political process and the devel-
opment of Black insurgency, 1930–1970, (2nd ed.).
Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
McAdam, D. (1983). Tactical innovation and the pace
of insurgency. American Sociological Review, 48(6),
735–754.
Meyer, D., & Corrigall-Brown, C. (2005). Coalitions and
political context: U.S. movements against wars in
Iraq. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 10(3),
327–344.
Meyer, D. S., & Whittier, N. (1994). Social movement
spillover. Social Problems, 41(2), 277–298.
Milkman, R. (2017). A new political generation: Millenni-
als and the post-2008wave of protest. American Soci-
ological Review, 82(1), 1–31.
Mische, A., & Pattison, P. (2000). Composing a civic
arena: Publics, projects, and social settings. Poetics,
27(2), 163–194.
Morris, A. D. (1993). Birmingham confrontation recon-
sidered: An analysis of the dynamics and tactics of
mobilization. American Sociological Review, 58(5),
621–636.
Park, H. (2008). Forming coalitions: A network-theoretic
approach to the contemporary South Korean envi-
ronmentalmovement.Mobilization: An International
Quarterly, 13(1), 99–114.
Passy, F. (2003). Social networks matter: But how? In M.
Diani & D. McAdams (Eds.), Social movements and
networks: Relational approaches to collective action
(pp. 21–47). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Polletta, F. (2002). Plotting protest. In J. E. Davis (Ed.), Sto-
ries of change: Narrative and social movements (pp.
31–51). Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Reagon, B. J. (1983). Coalition politics: Turning the cen-
tury. In B. Smith (Ed.), Home girls: A Black feminist
anthology (1st ed., pp. 356–368). New Burnswick, NJ:
Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press.
Roberts, D., & Jesudason, S. (2013). Moverment inter-
sectionality: The case of race, gender, disability, and
genetic technologies. Du Bois Review: Social Science
Research on Race, 10(2), 313–328.
Rosenthal, N., Fingrutd, M., Ethier, M., Karant, R., &
McDonald, D. (1985). Social movements and net-
work analysis: A case study of nineteenth-century
women’s reform in New York State. American Journal
of Sociology, 90(5), 1022–1054.
Saunders, C., Grasso, M., Olcese, C., Rainsford, E., &
Rootes, C. (2012). Explaining differential protest
participation: Novices, returners, repeaters, and
stalwarts. Mobilization: An International Quarterly,
17(3), 263–280.
Shaffer, M. B. (2000). Coalition work among environmen-
tal groups. In P. G. Coy (Ed.), Research in social move-
ments, conflicts and change (Vol. 22, pp. 111–126).
Bingley: Emerald.
Shows, C., & Gerstel, N. (2009). Fathering, class, and gen-
der: A comparison of physicians and emergencymed-
ical technicians. Gender and Society, 23(2), 161–187.
Sonmez, F. (2018, November 13). Ocasio-Cortez rallies
protesters at Pelosi’s office, expresses admiration for





Staggenborg, S. (1991). The pro-choice movement: Orga-
nization and activism in the abortion conflict. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Steedly, H. R., & Foley, J. W. (1979). The success of
protest groups: Multivariate analyses. Social Science
Research, 8(1), 1–15.
Strike With Us. (2020, October 21). You striked with us
and voted with us. Strikewithus.org. Retrieved from
https://strikewithus.org
Sunrise Team. (2020a). Sunrise taking actions for
black lives. Sunrise. Retrieved from https://docs.
google.com/document/d/1rwcHn_2KNbeom_
6lk2ENgGDAQW21cxaVFSZZamOrNYM/edit#
Sunrise Team. (2020b). Sunrise candidate program. Sun-
rise. Retrieved from https://www.sunrisemovement.
org/sunrise-candidate-program
Swank, E., & Fahs, B. (2013). An intersectional analysis of
gender and race for sexual minorities who engage in
gay and lesbian rights activism. Sex Roles, 68(11/12),
660–674.
Terriquez, V. (2015). Intersectional mobilization, social
movement spillover, and queer youth leadership in
the immigrant rights movement. Social Problems,
62(3), 343–362.
Thomas, J. B., & Trevino, L. K. (1993). Information pro-
cessing in strategic alliance building: A multiple-case
approach. Journal of Management Studies, 30(5),
779–814.
Thunberg, G. (2019, May 23). Young people have led
the climate strikes. Now we need adults to join us




Thunberg, G. (2020, August 19). After two years of
school strikes, the world is still in a state of climate
crisis denial. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/aug/
19/climate-crisis-leaders-greta-thunberg
Valentine, G. (2007). Theorizing and researching intersec-
tionality: A challenge for feminist geography. The Pro-
fessional Geographer, 59(1), 10–21.
Van Dyke, N. (2003). Crossing movement boundaries:
Factors that facilitate coalition protest by American
college students, 1930–1990. Social Problems, 50(2),
226–250.
Van Dyke, N., & McCammon, H. J. (2010). Strategic
alliances: Coalition building and social movements.
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Wadsworth, N. D. (2011). Intersectionality in California’s
same-sex marriage battles: A complex proposition.
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 112–123 122
Political Research Quarterly, 64(1), 200–216.
Wang, D., Piazza, A., & Soule, S. A. (2018). Boundary-
spanning in social movements: Antecedents and out-
comes. Annual Review of Sociology, 44, 167–187.
Wingfield, A. H. (2009). Racializing the glass escala-
tor: Reconsidering men’s experiences with women’s
work. Gender and Society, 23(1), 5–26.
About the Authors
Dana R. Fisher is a Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Maryland. Her
research focuses on studying democracy, civic participation, activism and environmental policymak-
ing. She has authored over 65 peer-reviewed research papers and book chapters, and has written six
books, including American Resistance (Columbia University Press, 2019). She is currently serving as a
Contributing Author for Working Group 3 of the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment writing about civic engage-
ment and activism.
Sohana Nasrin is a PhD Candidate at the Philip Merrill College of Journalism at the University of
Maryland, College Park. Sohana studies the often-complicated relationship between journalism and
activism, oppositional media practices, visuals, and climate change communication. Her current
research focuses on the activism and journalism of the youth climate movement.
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 112–123 123
